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ABSTRACT
Estimating the Effect of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring
on Riverboat Gaming Volume
by
Mikael Ahlgren
Dr Michael Dalbor, Examination Committee Chair
Associate Professor
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
This thesis analyzed the effect o f the 2003 Illinois gaming tax increase on the states
gaming demand. Slot machine coin-in was chosen to best represent gaming demand.
Coin-in data was retrieved from Illinois Gaming Commission reflecting the period from
January 2000 to December 2005.
Multiple regression analysis with dummy variables was used to model both the tax
increase and account for seasonality in the data. Because o f autocorrelation issues, a Box
Jenkins model was employed to address correlation o f error terms.
The findings revealed that Illinois experienced a decrease in gaming demand when
the tax increases took effect. In spite of the temptation to rely on gaming taxation to
solve state budgetary shortfalls, legislators should acknowledge and evaluate the negative
econom ic pressures tax increases have on the gam ing industry.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
The effects of changes in gaming taxes are widely debated among the various
stakeholders o f commercial gaming. The commercial gaming industry and its proponents
accept the general incidence of gaming taxes in part as an acceptable cost o f doing
business in an industry that in many cases is difficult if not impossible to enter. The
restricted access to operate legal commercial gaming is partially due to the restricted
nature o f licensure. The variance in the degree o f difficulty a potential commercial
gaming entity faces depends largely on state and local laws.
The Midwestern United States commercial gaming market has experienced two
trends since they opened in the early nineties; states have consistently deregulated to
better position their operators to compete for local and interstate gaming business. The
second trend has been the consistent increase in the various states’ percentage draw from
gaming revenues. These monies are paid in the form o f gaming taxes and have often
occurred in conjunction with deregulation. The purpose o f this research is to quantify the
effect of one o f these gaming tax increases on gaming demand/wagering volume which in
this thesis is represented by coin-in. Coin-in is a gaming term describing the total
amount of monies inserted into a slot machine. In contrast, table drop, a term
occasionally used by researchers to represent gaming volume, only describes the amount

a player purchases at a table and not the amount wagered (Kilby, Fox, & Lucas, 2004). It
is entirely conceivable a casino patron could purchase a million dollars in chips and put
none o f them at risk. Coin-in by contrast represents actual monies wagered and therefore,
functions as a more accurate representation o f demand (Eisendrath, Bernhard, Lucas, &
Murphy, 2008).
Illinois riverboats operators saw their highest tier gaming tax rate reach 70 percent on
July 1, 2003. The rate had grown steadily from the original flat rate o f 20 percent o f
adjusted gross revenue that the Illinois legislature had deemed suitable when commercial
gaming was initially introduced in 1991 (Illinois Gaming Board, 2005). The outcry from
commercial gaming and its benefactors to both this particular increase and the general
trend o f inflating gaming taxes was considerable. Christenson (2005) warns that gaming
taxes that rise above the 20 percent threshold begin to sway the industry from a focus on
economic development and related job creation and capital investment. Christenson also
cautions that rates that climb above the 35 percent level prohibit the economic viability o f
riverboat or racino operations in all but the most significantly undersupplied markets such
as the Chicago area in Illinois (Christiansen, 2005). Journalists Jamie Mckee and Marc
Falcone predict that Illinois’ attempt to capture increased revenues by increasing gaming
taxes would have the opposite effect. The tax increase trend had already restricted
operators innovations and additions that had been previously been planned to maintain
competitiveness with operators in surrounding states like Indiana, Missouri, and Iowa
(McKee, 2003). Falcone (2003) who is also a gaming analyst with Deutsche Bank
foretells that the three boats in the Illinois marketplace that had the potential to hit the 70
percent gaming tax threshold would actively attempt to manage their operations to reduce

revenues. He also foretells that all operators will engage in layoffs, restrict comps, rely
on fewer table games, and close ancillary facilities such as restaurants and hotels
(Falcone, 2003b). It is noteworthy to mention that if Falcone is correct in his prediction,
the gaming tax scenario provides gaming managers a motivation contrary to the universal
capitalist goal o f maximizing profits.
In an effort to examine the impact o f the 2003 tax restructuring this thesis is
organized as follows. To give the reader some perspective, a brief overview o f gaming
taxes in general will be presented. In particular, by examining gaming taxes with respect
to how they are levied in Illinois, the reader will better understand the market under
scrutiny. Through an examination o f how the Midwestern gaming industry has evolved
over the decade preceding the tax increases, a perspective o f how these changes impact
the market will be provided. After the overview is completed, a review summarizing
existing literature on implementation o f other similar tax increases on hospitality
concerns, commercial real estate, the tobacco industry, and eventually the gaming
industry will be undertaken.

This literature review will address the content, the related

research, and the particular methodologies chosen by various researchers to analyze data
with similarities to the data reflecting the Illinois gaming tax increase.
The framework constructed by the study o f related literature will direct the researcher
to the methodology appropriate to analyze the changes in gaming demand related to the
gaming tax changes. Using slot machine coin-in as representative o f gaming demand, the
research will employ a multiple regression model with dummy variables to represent the
2003 tax restructuring as well as account for the seasonal influences inherent in
hospitality time series models. Finally, the analysis will examine the residuals from the

multiple regression model to determine whether autocorrelation issues are resolved. The
results will reveal whether the implementation of a 70% tax tier and the accompanying
gaming tax restructuring had a statistically significant negative effect on gaming demand
as represented by the coin-in variable.
The implications o f the findings of this study are o f importance to both operators of
commercial gaming and the state and local entities that both oversee and profit from
commercial gaming’s revenues. If, as the gaming interests allege, state governments
regard commercial gaming as “magical money pumps exempt from the economic laws
that govern other activities - and able to pay whatever taxes are needed to make budgets
balance” (Christiansen, 2005) and the results o f this study indicate a increased gaming
taxes correlates with a decrease in gaming demand, state legislators may want to
reconsider past decisions or at the very least, consider these results when future policy on
gaming taxes is instituted. If gaming demand negatively impacted by inflated gaming
taxes, legislators who have legalized commercial gaming to supplement state and local
governments must be held to account if their decision to grab short-term revenue to ease
budgetary woes, negatively impacts their communities ability to share in long-term
revenues.
The results of this research along with their inherent implications must be considered
with perspective to this study’s limitations. First and foremost this study looks at a single
gaming tax increase in Illinois. Additional research addressing gaming tax fluctuations in
other states or foreign locales would help determine the representative value o f this study.
Secondly, coin-in is chosen as the variable representing gaming demand. Additional

research examining other measures o f demand such as table drop would further the
overall understanding o f how gaming demand reacts to fluctuations in gaming taxation.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
Introduction
This chapter provides a framework for understanding the impact on gaming demand
from changes to the Illinois gaming taxes in 2003. In addition, research in both gaming
and related topics such as real estate taxes and hotel occupancy taxes, is drawn upon to
provide reference for methodological alternatives. A general overview o f gaming
research assessing regulation and tax changes is included to provide a more
comprehensive understanding o f gaming taxes, regulation changes, and gaming
proliferation in the Midwestern, United States.
Illinois and Commercial Gaming
Illinois Legalizes Riverboat Gaming
In February 1990, Illinois became the second U.S. state to legalize riverboat gambling
when the Riverboat Gambling Act was enacted. Neighboring state Iowa preceded Illinois
when they legalized riverboat gambling in July o f 1989 (American Gaming Association,
2006). Illinois’ legislation authorized their Gaming Board to license up to ten operators.
The first riverboat, in Alton, opened September 11, 1991. The communities o f Alton,
Aurora, East Dubuque, East St. Louis, Elgin, Joliet, Metropolis, Peoria, and Rock Island
were all granted licenses by 1996 (Illinois Gaming Board, 2005).

Approaches to Legalized Gaming
Illinois adopted the “New Jersey” approach when it legalized commercial gaming
within its borders. The “New Jersey” approach is characterized by the use o f gambling
for the purpose of directing economic development to a restricted number of
communities, in this case along particular waterways. The “New Jersey Approach”
tends to base decisions on the potential negatives and actively differentiate the gaming
industry from other industry, justifying a more encompassing role for government. This
model utilizes commercial gaming to create enterprise zones which contribute benefits;
such as, capital investment, public sector revenue, jobs and increased tourism to a
predetermined number o f locations. This approach lends itself to relatively stricter
controls on the industry. The utilization o f riverboats further underscores the “New
Jersey” approach as the boats are both symbolically and physically separated from the
community at large. This divide emphasizes the intention to adopt gaming to address a
particular need, while mitigating anticipated negative repercussions {The national
gambling impact study commission fin a l report, 1999).
The “Nevada” model is different from the “New Jersey” model primarily in that it
views gambling as a business, which despite necessary safeguards, is best shaped by
market forces. Government’s role is primarily the oversight function. By ensuring
honest games and discouraging organized crime, the gaming industry is left with the
responsibility o f choosing location and deciding whether to add facilities. Other than
Nevada itself, Mississippi is an example o f a state that followed the “Nevada” model
{The national gambling impact study commission fin a l report, 1999).

Midwest Riverboat Gaming
Illinois and the three commercial gaming states on its border, Iowa, Indiana, and
Missouri, all followed the “New Jersey” model to the extent that they limited both the
number o f facilities and locations (The national gambling impact study commission final
report, 1999).
The state of Illinois authorizes each licensed riverboat operation to offer up to 1,200
gaming positions. These positions may be a combination o f table games and electronic
devices. The Riverboat Gambling Act was amended in 1999 to allow riverboats to be
permanently moored at docksites, thus ending the requirement that operators must
conduct cruises on waterways.

The Gambling Act further requires that patrons of

gambling areas o f the boats be 21 years o f age. Wagering in the casinos must be
conducted by cashless means, including; chips, tokens or vouchers.
Indiana, on the eastern border o f Illinois, legalized commercial gaming in November
o f 1993. The first, o f what has grown to ten Riverboats, opened in December o f 1995.
Commercial gaming in Indiana was restricted to Riverboats (Anderson, 2005).
Since the main topic of this research is gaming taxes, it may be necessary to
acknowledge that some dispute exists as to whether collection o f revenues generated
from gaming actually constitutes a tax. Some scholars have suggested that revenues
collected by the state from gaming operations do not constitute a tax, since gaming is a
voluntary act (Rivenbark & Rounsaville, 1996). However, Mikesell and Zorn (1988)
argued that net revenues generated from lottery operations were not discernable from
revenues captured from other sumptuary excise taxes. In both cases, revenues were
generated by means of a voluntary proposition and result in mandatory payments to the

State treasury (Mikesell & Zom, 1988). For the purpose o f this thesis, revenues generated
from gaming operations which are paid to the state are referred to as gaming taxes.
Gaming taxes are typically generated by wagering taxes, fees, and/or admissions
taxes. Wagering taxes are collected by all U.S. states that host commercial casinos
(American Gaming Association, 2006). Despite some minute differences in how
particular states define the tax base, all states use some form o f gross gambling receipt
minus payouts, or adjusted gross receipts (AGR) (Anderson, 2005). Fees are an addition
source o f revenue for many commercial gaming states. Riverboat states often charge a
licensing fee, which in the case o f Iowa is assessed based on capacity or in Mississippi, it
is assessed as a percentage o f AGR (Anderson, 2005). Admission taxes are the third
source o f revenue for both states and local government units, and are typical in riverboat
states. In these states, each gambler is required to pay a fee when entering or boarding
the facility (Anderson, 2005). Admission taxes range from a set dollar amount to a
graduated tax assessment. For example, some states vary the charge with respect to size
o f facility or past visitor volume (American Gaming Association, 2006). Table 1
illustrates the changes to Gaming taxation in Illinois and its neighbor state Indiana from
years 2000 to 2005.

Table 1
2000-2005 Illinois & Indiana State Riverboat Taxes
State
Illinois

2000
Graduated
T ax Rate
from 20%
to 35% o f
gross
gam ing
revenue,$2
per patron
adm issions
tax

2002
2004
2005
2003
Graduated
Graduated Tax
Graduated
Graduated
Tax Rate
Tax Rate
Rate from 15%
Tax Rate
from 15% to
from 15% to
to
from 15% to
50% o f gross
50% (M axim um
70% o f gross
70% o f gross
tax rate through
gam ing
gam ing
gam ing
reven u e,$ 3revenue,$2June 2 0 0 2 reven u e,$3$3 per
35% ) o f gross
$5 per
$5 per
patron
patron
gam ing
patron
ad m ission s
adm issions
reven u e,$3 per
adm issions
tax
tax
patron
tax
adm issions tax
Indiana 20% tax on
Graduated
Graduated
20% tax
Graduated tax
Graduated
gross
tax rate from
Tax Rate o f
rate on
rate from 15% to
tax rate from
gam ing
15% to 35%
15% to 35%
gross
35% (M axim um
15% to 35%
revenue
gam ing
tax rate through
o f gross
o f gross
o f gross
gam in g
June 2 0 0 2 gam ing
reven u e,$3
gam ing
revenue, $3
revenue,3$
per patron
20% ) o f gross
revenue, $3
per patron
per patron
adm ission
gam ing revenue,
per patron
tax
$3 per patron
ad
m
ission
s
adm
issions
adm issions
tax
tax
ad m ission s tax
tax
N ote. G am ing Taxation Rates were retrieved from A m erican G am ing A sso cia tio n State o f the States 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 6 . R etrieved April 12, 2 0 0 7 from h ttp://w w w .am ericangam ing.ora/survev/index.cfm
2001
Graduated
T ax Rate
from 15%
to 35% o f
gross
gam ing
revenue,$2
per patron
adm issions
tax

It is significant to note that all gaming taxes illustrated in Table 1 are in addition to and
not in lieu o f regular business income and real estate taxes. Gaming taxes are often
characterized as being paid for the privilege of operating gaming facilities (Christiansen,
2005).
Illinois Gaming Tax Rates
By means of the Riverboat Gambling Act, the State o f Illinois assesses taxes on
riverboat gambling operations by both an admission tax and a wagering tax. Table 2
illustrates in greater detail the changes in the graduated gaming taxes in Illinois from July
2001 to July 2005.
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Table 2
Detailed Overview o f Illinois Gaming Taxes
July 1, 2 0 0 2 - June 3 0 , 2003 A djusted G ross R evenue Tax Rates
15% up to

22.5% over

27.5% over

32.5% over

37.5% over

45% over

50% over

$25

$25 up to

$5 0 up to

$ 75 up to

$ 1 0 0 up to

$ 1 5 0 up to

$200

M illion

$ 5 0 M illion

$75 M illion

$ 1 0 0 M illion

$ 1 5 0 M illion

$ 2 0 0 M illion

M illion

July 1, 2003 - June 3 0 , 2 0 0 5

A djusted G ross R evenue Tax Rates

15% up to

27.5% over

32.5% over

37.5% over

45% over

50% over

70% over

$25

$25 up to

$ 3 7 .5 up to

$ 5 0 up to

$ 75 up to

$ 100 up to

$200

M illion

$ 3 7 .5

$ 5 0 M illion

$ 75 M illion

$100

$200

M illion

M illion

M illion

M illion

N ote. A d m ission tax rate; $3, $4 or $5 Per A d m ission -D ep en d en t upon previous calendar year adm ission
total (L ess than 1 m illion = $3, 1 m illion to 2.3 m illion - $4, greater than 2.3 m illion = $ 5 ) Local share =
S I , A ll over $ 1 = State share
A G R Tax; P rogressive Tax Rate (indicated ab ove) on calendar Y T D A G R level (G ross G am in g R eceipts
minus Patron W in) Local Share = 5% o f A G R at all lev els, State Share = remainder o f p rogressive %
C om m on S ch o o l Fund receives the increased A G R T axes (Increase o f 7 /1 /2 0 0 3 A G R Rates over 7 /1 /2 0 0 2
Rates
July 1, 2 0 0 5 A djusted G ross R evenue Tax Rates
15% up to

22.5% over

27.5% over

32.5% over

37.5% over

45% over

50% over

$25

$ 25 up to

$ 5 0 up to

$ 75 up to

$ 1 0 0 up to

$ 1 5 0 up to

$200

M illion

$ 5 0 M illion

$ 75 M illion

$100

$150

$200

M illion

M illion

M illion

M illion

N ote. Information retrieved from Illinois G am in g Board annual report 2 0 0 5 . R etrieved March 10, 2 0 0 7
from http;//w w w .igb.state.il.us/annualreport/
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Illinois Overview
The initial tax increase noted above that was approved by the Illinois Legislature on
June 3, 2002, had a profound negative impact on the gaming market. As a reference the
Dow Jones Industrial Average declined by 2.2 percent on that date. Gaming stocks
declined significantly further as illustrated in Table 3.

Table 3
Gaming Stock Market Performance June 3. 2002 _______________________________
Closing P rice
C om pany___________________________________ Percentage Change
M andalay R esort Group
-6.4%
Harrah's Entertainment

-7.7%

B oyd G am ing

-14.4%

H ollyw ood C asinos____________________________ -20% ____________________________________________
N ote. Prices are reported from the M ichael P o llo c k ’s G am ing Industry O bserver in the report,
E xam ining im pacts on A tlantic City o f proposed tax increases, V ET com petition, Report retrieved from
the files o f the A m erican G am ing A ssociation , 1 2 9 9 Pennsylvania A v e., N W Suite 1175, W ashington, D C.
2004.

MGM, who did not have any gaming interest in Illinois, withdrew a bid o f $615
million to acquire a casino license in a Chicago suburb. A Harrah’s conference call to
investors revealed the cancellation o f plans to build a $40 million hotel to enhance the
Metropolis riverboat. MGM Mirage released a statement announcing their intention to
focus their efforts on jurisdictions that provide a “stable and reasonable tax environment”
(Pollock, Morowitz, & Gushin).
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Tax Effects
In an attempt to draw parallels to other situations that mirror the increase in gaming
taxes in Illinois, reviewing research that addressed hotel occupancy taxes, the 1986 Tax
Reform Act on Real Estate, and sin taxes on cigarettes proved instructive. These
particular examples not only informed the understanding o f likely effects o f inherent
changes to taxation rates but also provided insight into various suitably applicable
methodologies that provided valuable analysis into the Illinois gaming tax restructuring.
Occupancy Taxes
Hiemstra and Ismail (1992) examined the enactment o f occupancy taxes by
municipalities. They asserted that legislators erroneously chose these means o f
generating revenues because occupancy taxes primarily affect travelers who are non
constituents. However, the researchers showed by analyzing the elasticity of demand
(occupancy) that the saying Tanstaafl rang true. There was no such thing as a free lunch
in this case, as a 9.8% room tax resulted in a 3% drop in occupancy (Hiemstra & Ismail,
1992; Hiemstra & Ismail, 1993). The aforementioned scenario mirrors the allegations of
gaming’s stakeholders who suggest that legislators view commercial gaming as a
bottomless source of income which is impermeable to classic economic pressures
(Christiansen, 2005).
1986 Tax Reform Act
The 1986 Tax Reform Act was characterized as the most significant adaptation o f the
tax code since its formation in the 1950’s. When the tax reform was analyzed, real
estate, in particular, proved to occupy the mantle o f most affected industries. The
primary aspects o f real estate investment impacted were depreciation scheduling; in
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addition, flow-through tax losses were reduced, and loss offset limitations were instituted
(Sanger, Sirmans, & Turnbull, 1990).
Sanger (1990) utilized intervention analysis (defined as an intervention in a time
series) because an event, in this case the tax reform, represented a change in the
stochastic process. The dependent variable in this study was the security returns o f Real
Estate Investment Trusts, known as REITS. These entities invest in real estate and real
estate related assets with the purpose o f generating a return for their investors (US
securities & exchange commission.2QQA). Sanger employed dummy variables to model
the tax intervention as well as account for seasonal effects. The study’s results indicated
that the market assessed the changes in the tax code to the disadvantage o f real estate
owners (Sanger et al., 1990).
Another study that sought to understand the effects of the 1986 Tax Reform Act was
undertaken by Smith and Woodward (1996). The researchers sought to evaluate the
effects o f the above mentioned tax reform in terms o f the consequence the changes had
on the value o f apartments. Utilizing a time-series cross-sectional panel data design to
examine their data, the researchers found that a couple o f obstacles threatened the quality
o f their results. The degree of overbuilding needed to be controlled for the examined
regions. In addition, because o f the nature o f time-series analysis the authors
acknowledged the potential for autocorrelation. Tests proved autocorrelation was a
factor and the researchers relied on the Parks method of analysis to address the issue.
Applying a dummy variable to represent the tax changes and controlling for the
degree o f overbuilding, the researchers concluded the 1986 Tax Reform Act .had a
statistically significant negative effect on apartment values (Smith & Woodward, 1996).
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Cigarettes and Sin Taxes
Sin Taxes are taxes that are attaehed to serviees or produets that are viewed as vices.
This form o f tax is retained in part to discourage an activity or the acquisition o f a
product. These taxes also serve to generate revenue for the government entity be it a
federal, state of local municipality, who levies the tax (Investopedia.). Cigarette
smoking, drinking aleohol and wagering are all aetivities that are subject to sin taxes.
Former United States Surgeon General, C. Everett Koop, wrote in 2004 that
studies have eonsistently shown that inereasing the eost o f tobacco products reduces their
demand (Koop, Riehmond, & Steinfeld, 2004). Koop dubiously suggested that these “sin
taxes” only affeet the sinner, ignoring the impact o f loss o f demand for a product an
entire industry and its many stakeholders depend on to provide salaries, investment
returns, and pensions.
An example o f a study that supports Koop’s eorrelation between sin taxes and a
reduction in demand is Wei Tan’s use o f statistical simulations in his work with smoking
rates. Tan’s simulations consistently reinforced the negative impaet tax inereases had on
smoking rate in both the short and the long term (Tan, 2006).
Gaming Forecasting
Deregulation
A number o f researchers have addressed how deregulation has affected gaming
volume. Methodologically, these examinations o f deregulation were often similar as well
as pertinent to understanding how to approach a tax increase. Although the effeet of
deregulation and a tax increase might be opposite, they both share a main characteristic.
In both events a single inflection point is introduced in the analysis o f a time series
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(Eisendrath, 2005). In the Midwestern commercial gaming market, these acts o f
deregulation have often been tied to increases in gaming tax rates.
Deregulation in Atlantic City
In Nichols (1998) looked at the 1991 deregulation o f Atlantic City commercial
gaming, Nichols chose a Box Jenkins autoregressive moving average or ARIMA model
to conduct his analysis. Nichols measured the effect of an increase in operating hours
and slot machine space on gaming win. The study acknowledged an inlierent
shortcoming o f operationalizing the demand or volume variable as casino win. Win, or
gambler’s losses equals gross gaming revenue. Gross gaming revenue is problematic as a
measure because it includes money that is originally distributed by the casino as
complimentaries or “comps”; therefore the casino is winning back its own cash. Nichols
quantified the comp ratio as 8.5% o f total win. Nichols supported his choice of gaming
win because, unlike EBITDA and general revenue related data for example, win does not
include non-gaming revenues which distort the results (Nichols, 1998b).
Prior to NichoTs research, Shonkwiler (1993) relied on a structural time series model
to evaluate the impact o f Atlantic City commercial casinos on gaming volume in Nevada.
This study addressed the impact o f an extraneous event on time series data. Shonkwiler
supported his methodological choice by promoting the value of structural time series for
the modeling o f linear (stochastic) trends and seasonality. Shonkwiler’s research
concluded that the introduction o f Atlantic City casinos reduced Nevada gaming revenues
by between 10 and 12 percent (Shonkwiler, 1993).
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Deregulation o f Midwest Riverboats
Nichols (1998a) also addressed deregulation o f the United States Midwestern
riverboat market the same year he produced his study on Atlantic City. In a response to
the 1994 Illinois’ introduction o f less regulated riverboat gambling, Iowa revamped their
1991 original strict inaugural regulations and eliminated mandated sailing, loss limits and
space restrictions. Choosing casino win, total admissions and win per admission as his
dependent variables, Nichols used regression analysis to control for the effect o f day of
the week, seasonality, location, and per capita income while attempting to evaluate the
impact o f deregulation. Nichols’ results indicated that deregulation was an impetus for
significant cross-border substitution as well having been responsible for increases in the
three dependent variables; win, win per admission, and admission (Nichols, 1998).
Nichols work with Iowa and Illinois riverboat deregulation has obvious similarities to this
study’s investigation into the impact of gaming taxation in Illinois.
Econometric Models
Thalheimer and Ali (2003) developed an econometric model to identify determinates
o f demand, particularly slot demand, for 24 Midwestern riverboats and racinos. The
researchers examined the effects o f “traditional demand” variables as well as location and
government restrictions. Thalheimer and Ali identified variables such betting limits,
access, win, and number of tables in an effort to explain changes in slot volume. Slot
volume was divided by the market area population surrounding the riverboat or casino in
an effort to control for the population effect. The study’s model showed an extremely
impressive degree of explanatory power (R squared = 0.937) thus concluding that
population and its access to facility was positively related to slot demand, access to
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competing facilities had a negative impact, and restrictive limits on gaming was also
negatively related to slot demand (Thalheimer & Ali, 2003). Despite the similarities, it
is noteworthy to point out that the Thalheimer and Ali (2003) research examined the
impact of the independent variable such as access and limits at the single property level
rather than gaming volume at the state level (Eisendrath, 2005).
In an effort to assist the accuracy o f Nevada’s budgetary planning and with the
recognition o f the significance that gaming taxes play in the Nevada state budget, Cargill
and Eadington (1978) endeavored to construct a means for forecasting gaming revenues.
By first assessing seasonal variations and patterns and then employing multiple
regression equations to identify statistically significant correlations, the researchers
finally chose the Box Jenkins method to provide the forecasting. The earlier stages of
this often cited study o f gaming reflected the methodology choice o f this more narrow
research (Eadington & William R., 1978). Like Cargill and Eadington, this study sought
to identify whether a particular tax increase has an effect on gaming volume. Unlike
Cargill and Eadington, this study o f the 2003 Illinois tax increase did not attempt to
forecast the long term effects of the restructuring primarily because the change was not
permanent.
The Illinois Market
Turco and Riley (1996) looked at the factors that are important to riverboat gamblers
when choosing a facility and also investigated alternate activities a gambler might
consider engaging in with their gaming budget. The researchers’ concentrated their study
on the Illinois market.

Loyalty as reflected by favorite place to play was shown to be an

important factor for gamers when choosing gambling venues (Turco & Riley, 1996).
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Based on Turco and Riley’s investigation it is feasible to investigate an impact on gaming
demand from a reduction o f complimentaries which are dispensed to gamers in an effort
to build loyalty
Bowen (1994) addressed the value of relationship marketing when he pointed out the
connection between satisfaction and loyalty. His article described the emergence o f slot
clubs and the use o f targeted promotions to develop relationships with known players
whose values were then tracked by the casino. Bowen identified an Aurora, Illinois
riverboat as an example of a facility that tracked and rated its players. After assessing a
player’s worth, the casinos could choose to forgo parking revenue in exchange for what
the operator believed would be a better relationship with their customer (Bowen, 1994).
Gaming analyst Falcone echoed this relationship and predicted a reduction in comp play,
food, and lodging when describing the 2003 Illinois tax restructuring (Falcone, 2003b).
To understand the pressure that falls onto marketing expenditures such as costs, it is
important to understand that unlike products like tobacco and alcohol, casino operators
do not provide a product with price elasticity because of their relative difficulty in
passing on increases in operator expenses to their customers. An operator could employ
unpopular measures such as tightening the hold or par o f their slot machines and thereby
raise the price to play but this may lead to a decrease in demand. Typically, the burden of
tax increases rests on operators and is expressed through lower rates o f invested capital,
decreased development projects, reduction in employees, and in the limitation of
marketing and/or complimentary expenses (Falcone, 2003a).
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Measuring Demand
When foreeasting or quantifying gaming volume, researchers have relied on
numerous variables as mentioned throughout this review o f related literature. This study
will utilize slot maehine eoin-in as the indieator o f gaming demand or volume. The
deeision to rely on coin-in is based on a number o f faetors. First and foremost, all the
alternative measures of gaming demand are fundamentally problematie. The majority o f
operators do not and/or eannot quantify the amount wagered on table games (Eisendrath
et ah, 2008). The measure of table drop, as previously mentioned, reflects the amount
eonverted to ehips and does not represent the amount wagered. Revenue figures ean
vary with short-term luek and volatility on both the player and easino’s part (Kilby et ah,
2004). Therefore, coin-in reflects the most aecurate and least eontaminated measure of
gaming volume (Eisendrath et ah, 2008; hueas, Dunn, & Kharitonova, 2006).
The seeond reason this research relied on eoin-in to represent gaming demand is the
predominanee o f the eoin-in eontribution to the overall eommercial easino revenue
sources. Numerous researehers on the has Vegas, Nevada market have chosen coin-in as
the preferential proxy for gaming demand and justified the decision partially due to the
important eontribution eoin-in makes towards overall revenues. Slot win aeeounts for
approximately 50 pereent o f gaming win in the Las Vegas market (Eisendrath et ah,
2008). In eontrast, slot maehines or eleetronie gaming deviees (EGDs) aeeount for
nearly 90 percent o f Illinois adjusted gaming revenues (Illinois Gaming Board, 2005). In
an effort to compare the contributions o f table games as they compare to slots, a
researeher might choose to eontrast table drop to coin-in or simply compare the adjusted
gross revenues o f the games. As previously mentioned both AGR and table drop are
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problematic. For the sake o f comparison comparing the games on the basis o f AGR is
the most accurate because it reflects actual play, which is not guaranteed when table drop
enters the equation. Figure 1 shows the different AGR contributions by the two revenue
sources: table games and slots (described as EGD’s in this example).

Time S eries Plot of Table Game AGR, EGD AGR, Total AGR
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% $ 1,000,000,000-

Û
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Figure 1. Adjusted Gross Revenue contribution o f both Table Games and EGD’s (Slots)
Data retrieved from the Illinois Gaming Board Annual Reports 2001, 2003, and 2005.
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CHAPTER 3

DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Introduction
This chapter first presents the hypotheses to be tested. In addition the source and type
o f data are revealed. Dependent and independent variables are identified and the use of
multiple regression is briefly explained. In addition, assumptions inherent to the use of
multiple regression is presented along with the frequent violation o f these assumptions
that typically occurs when analyzing time series data. Lastly, methods for countering the
aforementioned violations are discussed.
Hypotheses
It is hypothesized that the restructuring of the Illinois gaming tax in 2003 will show a
negative impact on gaming demand as represented by the dependent coin-in response
variable. The term “2003 70% tax and overall tax restructuring” represents the
independent or predictor dummy variable for the tax change.
Main Hypothesis
The null hypothesis states that there is no difference in coin-in after the Illinois tax
restructuring. The null is expressed by the equation:
Ho : Coefficient o f “2003 70% tax and overall tax restructuring” = 0
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The research hypothesis which predicts that there will be a difference in coin-in is
expressed by the equation:
H\ : Coefficient o f “2003 70% tax and overall tax restructuring’V 0
Secondary Tests fo r Trend and Seasonality
The multiple linear regression will include a time variable testing for trend. The time
variable is assigned as follows: the first month is “ 1”, second month “2” and so forth.
Trend is characterized as the upward or downward movement o f a time series over a
period of time. Trend is typically referred to as long-term growth or decline. When
analyzing data from a particular industry, trend generally reflects factors such as changes
in total population, market growth, or long-term changes in per capita income
(Bowerman, O'Connell, & Koehler, 2005).
Seasonality will be assessed by the use o f dummy variables representing the months
February through December. Seasonality or seasonal variations describe the time series’
flow o f peaks and valleys that are completed within a calendar year. Factors such as
weather and customs tend to impact the seasonality of a time series. When using dummy
variables to test monthly data for seasonality, only 11 months are represented by
variables. The twelfth month is represented by the constant term o f the equation. It
makes no difference which month is omitted.
Data Collection
Secondary data for this study is compiled from Illinois Gaming Board Monthly
Revenue Reports (IGB, 2000-2006), comprised o f monthly commercial gaming
information from January 2000 to December 2006. This public data is available from
the Illinois Gaming Board website and via request from the same entity. Each Illinois

23

docksite is required by their licensure to provide this information in a timely manner to
the state office o f the Illinois Gaming Board. The information is made public shortly
thereafter. As previously discussed, this research will use the independent variable coinin as reported by the various docksites in Illinois for the 60 monthly periods covered.
Coin-in is reported on a monthly basis by each docksite to the Illinois Gaming Board.
Coin-in has been chosen as the proxy for gaming demand due to its reliability and due to
the dominant contribution o f slots/EGDs to overall gaming revenue. Figure 2 illustrates a
detailed breakdown o f the relative importance o f Slot (EGD) contribution to revenues on
a docksite by docksite basis.

2003 Table Games vs Slot (EGD's) AGR by
Docksite
$ 3 5 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
$ 3 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
$ 2 5 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0

$ 200 ,000,000
$ 1 5 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0

$ 100 ,000,000
$ 5 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0

m

$0

i

I

y
Figure 2 Illinois Docksite AGR Comparison o f Table Games vs. Slots.
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H Table G a m e s
*EGD

Linear Regression Model
With a multiple linear regression model (MLR) we have a single dependent variable
(y) or response variable and more than one independent or predictor variables (x) and the
objective is to fit a linear equation
This thesis we will attempt to fit the regression model:
Yt = Po + Pit + PzFeb + P]Mar + PjApr + P^May + p ju n e + P?July + P«Aug +
p,Sept + Pi.Oct + PiiNov + p.zDec + Pu70%tax + et
7/ = Illinois Statewide Coin-in in dollars
The unknown parameters are found by minimizing the error sum o f squares. The
regression equation relates the average value of y when the independent variables are set

at(;r^._,A^).
A dummy variable is used for period that reflects the 70% tax level and the overall
2003 Illinois tax restructuring = {1 if period with tax hike, 0 otherwise}. The “t” variable
represents the trend component which as previously mentioned assesses whether there is
long-term positive or negative movement in the data over time. The months FebruaryDecember are treated as seasonal dummy variables. For example: Feb = {1 if period t is
February , 0 otherwise}.
The assumption of this model is that error terms are independent and normally
distributed with mean 0 and a common unknown variance sigma squared. With
hospitality and gaming data this assumption of independence is often violated. In time
series regression residuals are tested for autocorrelation. Autocorrelation occurs when
error terms are not random and positive terms tend to be followed by positive terms and
negative terms tend to be followed by negative terms. Without assessing diagnosing
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autocorrelation, the predictive value o f the model is compromised. Lastly, an additional
implied implication is that the regression model is linear.
Selection o f Time Series Model
Because of the seasonal nature of hospitality and gaming, it is necessary to employ
time series modeling to deal with autocorrelation. One method o f addressing seasonality
is through the use o f dummy variables. The main advantage o f the dummy variable
approach is that it results in a regression equation that visibly reveals the impact of
statistically significant seasonal variation unlike a Box Jenkins Model which operates like
a ‘black box’ into which the data are entered and a forecast is produced with no insight
into the impact o f the individual variables such as seasonality or trend.
Treating monthly data (coin-in) captured from the Illinois Gaming Board requires the
creation o f dummy variables for 11 months. The twelfth month is represented by the
constant term of the regression equation. Each month is then tested for significant
variation and discarded if it proves insignificant. The model implies that the magnitude
o f seasonal variation is independent o f the trend o f the constant seasonal change.
An important value o f the use o f dummy variables is their ability to ensure that
appropriate seasonal parameters are included in the model for each time period. Once the
regression model is established, the next step is to examine the error terms for
autocorrelation. If autocorrelation is a significant factor, then the correct procedure is to
use a Box Jenkins model to address the problematic error terms.
Intervention models are often employed to model the occurrence o f exceptional
external events or “interventions”. Examples include labor strikes, terrorist acts like
September 11, 2001 or policy changes like a tax restructuring. This model adopts the
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appropriately defined dummy variable to represent the occurrence o f the intervention or
in this case the tax restructuring. The addition o f dummy variable can be permanent if
the intervention such as September 11 is a onetime intervention that continues to impact
Las Vegas tourism for an indefinite amount o f time or in the case of the Illinois gaming
tax restructuring, the dummy variable can be added when the restructuring occurred and
subtracted when the gaming tax was returned to previous levels.
Conclusion
The research hypothesis asserting that gaming demand will be negatively impacted by
increased levels o f taxation in Illinois will be tested by multiple regression analysis. The
regression will include variables describing the long-term movement or trend o f Illinois
gaming demand. In addition, variables will be created to assess the impact o f seasonality
on the time series under scrutiny. The regression’s error terms will be tested for
autocorrelation, which if present, will be controlled by a Box Jenkins model. The next
chapter presents the analysis o f the data and the results.
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CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS OF THE STUDY
Introduction
The following pages provide a detailed description o f the analysis o f the data with the
methodology presented in the previous chapter.
refined.

The regression model will be tested and

The impact o f autocorrelation will be measured and countered.

Finally, the

chapter concludes with the presentation o f the results of the analysis.
Analysis o f the Data
The following regression model was tested using Minitab 15.
Yt = p.i + Pit + PzFeb + P^Mar + p4Apr + p.May + pJu n e + p ju ly + p«Aug +
p.;Sept + PioOct + PiiNov + PiiDec + Pii70%tax + et
The variables were tested for significance at the .05 level.
The first regression was run to test all the variables identified in the model. The intention
is to eliminate any variables that fail to meet the .05 significance threshold.

28

Figure 3 illustrates the Minitab output assessing the significance o f the variables o f
interest.

Predictor
Coef
Constant
1939589342
t
417122
DFeb
4128735
DMar
167643185
DApr
93402777
DMay
121833655
DJun
10924962
DJul
151304124
DAug
67085289
DSep
-13593833
DOct
5870903
DNov
-34818934
-30747198
DDec
70%
-143804986

T

SE C o e f

25004291
292029
32294243
32298204
32304804
32314043
32325916
32374642
32357559
32377320
32399701
32424697
32452301
15386723

77.57
1.43
0.13
5.19

P

-1 .07

0.000
0.158
0.899
0.000
0.005
0.000
0.736
0.000
0.042
0.676
0.857
0.287

-0.95
-9.35

0.347
0.000

2.89

3.77
0.34

4 .67
2.07

-0.42
0.18

VI:
1.154
1.833
1.834

1.835
1.836
1.837

1.843
1.841
1.843
1.845
1.848

1.851
1.139

Figure 3. Assessment o f significance o f independent variables o f interest. The Illinois
tax restructuring dummy variable is noted as “70%”. Each month is described by the
notation “D” representing dummy + monthly abbreviation. Hence the variable
representing February in the model is noted as “DFeb” and so one for the eleven months
examined.
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The trend variable was eliminated based on the inability to reject H,> = 0 (p=.158).
The following graph reflects the lack o f overall upward trend to Illinois coin-in during the
period under scrutiny.

Time Series Plot of sta te coin-in
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Figure 4. Time Series Plot o f Illinois coin-in from 2000-2006 which details the lack o f
negative or positive trend in the data.

A number o f the dummy variables representing the months proved to be statistically
insignificant when measured at the .05 significance threshold. For example; the February
dummy variable was eliminated based on the inability to reject Ho = 0 (p=.899). Based
on the same standard; June, September, October, November, and December were all
discarder from the regression equation. Discussion o f possible reasons for the lack of
significance will be presented at the end o f the chapter.
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The remaining variables were then retested with the following results:

The regression equation is
state coin-in = 1.95E+09 + 1.7 4E+08 DMar + l.OOE+08 DApr + 1.29E+08 DMay
+ 1.58E+08 DJul + 75702571 DAug - 1.36E+08 70% + Et

Predictor
Constant
DMar
DApr
DMay
DJul
DAug

Coef
1947191948
174174857
100351571
129199571
158437546
75702571

70%

-136337820

S = 59808082

SE Coef

P

T

VIF

9473873

205.53

0.000

24166114
24166114
24166114

7.21
4 .15
5.35

0 .000
0 .000

1. 048

24252621

6.53
3.13
-9.52

0.000
0.000
0.002

1 .048
1.055
1 .048

0 .000

1.008

24166114
14326133

R-Sq = 71.0%

1.048

R-Sq(adj) = 68.8%

Analysis of Variance
Source
Regression
Residual Error
Total

DF
SS
MS
F
P
6 6.75878E+17 1.12646E+17 31.49 0.000
77 2.75430E+17 3.57701E+15
83 9.51308E+17___________________________

Figure 5. Minitab output detailing final regression equation.

All coefficients were found to be significant at the .05 level, thus rejecting all null
hypotheses. Most significantly, the variable representing the Illinois 2003 70% tax and
overall tax restructuring was found to be a statistically significant (p - .000) factor on
gaming demand as represented by statewide coin-in. Variance inflation factors (VIF),
which indicate potential multicollinearity were also calculated. Numbers over 10 indicate
a significant multicollinearity problem, however the results all show a VIF under 2,
which is considered acceptable and indicates that multicollinearity is not an issue with the
model.
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The residuals were tested with Minitab 15 for autocorrelation as shown in Figure 6:

Autocorrelation Function for RESI2
(with 5% significance limits for the autocorrelations)
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Partial Autocorrelation Function for RESI2
(with 5% significance limits for the partial autocorrelations)
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Figure 6. ACF and PACF Minitab plots o f regression residuals.
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The ACF plot depicted in Figure 6, also called the sample autocorrelation function
(SAC) and the PACF also called the sample partial autocorrelation function are used to
define the correct Box Jenkins model. The behavior, severity, and pattern o f spikes
determine which model is the best fit.
The spikes revealed on the above autocorrelation function for Residual 2 suggest the
influence o f autocorrelation in the error term o f the first lag (1 month). An ARIMA or
Box Jenkins model is adopted to resolve the issue o f autocorrelation. Based on the spike
at lag one o f the autocorrelation chart, a non seasonal (0,0,1) ARIMA model was used.
The (0,0,1) ARIMA residuals (Residual 3) were then examined to access whether the
autocorrelation problem was resolved.

Autocorrelation Function for RESI3
(with 5% significance limits for the autocorrelations)
1.00 .8 0 .6 -

c 0 .4 o
4->

JS
«u
u

0 .2 0 .0 -

I I I I ■ I . I
I I

8
O -0 .2 3

<

' I I ' ' I

-0 .4 -0 .6 -0 .8 -1 .0 -

2

—r~
4

—I—
6

8

12

10

14

—

I—

—

16

Lag

Figure 7. ACF Minitab output confirming the effect o f (0,0,1) ARIMA.
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The autocorrelation function for RESI3 confirms that the autocorrelation issues were
successfully addressed. The final regression equation is now modified to reflect the Box
Jenkins.
Illinois coin-in = 1.95E+09 + 1.74E+08 DMar + 1.OOE+08 DApr + 1.29E+08 DMay
+ 1.58E+08 DJul + 75702571 DAug - 1.36E+08 70% + e,
Where ei = ai + .2264a / -

1

where a i- \~ N (0 ,

)

The notations in the final regression equation reflect the following. “E” is a scientific
notation for an exponential. In the above example; 1.95E+09 is the same as 1.95 billion.
The “e” in the equation represents the error term for the regression equation. The “a”
signifies the error term from the Box Jenkins treatment. The following figure depicts the
output o f the ARIMA:

ARIMA Model: RESI2
Final Estimates of Parameters
Type
IÆA

Coef SE Coef ■
1

-0.2264

0.1085

T
-2.09

P
0.040

Number of observations: 84
Residuals:
SS = 2592 90087 53352717 0 (backforecasts excluded)
MS -

3123976958235267

DF = 83

Modified Box-Pierce (Ljung-Box) Chi-Square statistic
Lag
Chi-Square
DF
P-Value

12
11.3
11
0.420

24
32.4
23
0.091

36
46.8
35
0.087

48
65.2
47
0.040

Figure 8. Minitab final (0,0,1) ARIMA output. “MA” as noted under “Type” refers to
moving average.

34

The Chi-Square presented towards the bottom of Figure 8 confirms behavior o f the
ACF graph from Figure 7. The Chi-Square “Lag 12” column (bold type column in
Figure 8) has a P-Value o f .420 which is the result o f testing if the correlations up to lag
12 are significant or not. The lag correlations are tested by the chi-square by setting up
each lag as a null hypothesis. The null hypotheses all state that no correlation o f lags
exists. The alternate hypothesis in this case states that there exists a correlation. The
.420 indicates that the null should not be rejected and there is no correlation in the final
model.
The regression equation reported an R squared o f 71%. R squared represents the
proportion o f the sample variation o f coin-in that was due to the variation of the
independent variables in the final regression equation. The ideal R squared value is 1 or
100 %.

Discussion o f Results
The regression model confirms that the 2003 Illinois Tax Restructuring had a
negative effect on gaming demand. Trend was not a component in the final model.
Previous tax increases, increased competition with surrounding states, and the increase in
price for the final Illinois docksite license which hindered the sale o f the last license all
contribute to explain the overall lack o f change in coin-in trend. The months o f March,
April, May, July, and August were all significant positive seasonal components in the
final regression model. It should be remembered that Illinois is a Midwestern state were
weather plays a factor in most activities. This may explain why the spring and summer
months reveal a positive influence on gaming demand. It is conceivable that June does
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not reflect this increase since it is associated with the end o f the school year and families
might vacation around non-garning activities.
Conclusion
The regression modeling o f assessing impact o f the 2003 Illinois tax restructuring on
gaming demand successfully demonstrated a statistically significant negative correlation.
The increased taxes resulted in decreased gaming demand. The following chapter will
discuss inherent limitations, managerial implications, and lastly provide guidance for
future research.

CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Introduction
This chapter focuses on conclusions that can be drawn from the results section o f the
data analysis. In addition, implications o f the results as well as recommendations for
future studies are discussed. The general purpose o f the research was to investigate
whether the gaming industry was governed by the same economic forces with respect to
taxation as other industries and specifically the main research question asked whether
increases in gaming taxes resulted in a decrease in gaming demand.
The research project entailed obtaining Illinois state monthly coin-in data from
January 2000 to December 2006. After a thorough literature review, the researcher
chose regression analysis with dummy variables to model the intervention o f the 2003
70% gaming tax and the general gaming tax restructuring. Dummy variables measuring
seasonality in the monthly data were also included in the regression model. Finally,
because the regression’s error terms indicated autocorrelation a Box Jenkins model was
employed to resolve this issue.
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Findings and Contributions
The results o f the study support the findings o f research on occupancy taxes, real
estate taxation, and sin taxes that have consistently found a negative correlation between
demand and increased taxation and restrictions. Specifically, this thesis supports the
research hypothesis predicting that increased gaming taxes will have a negative impact on
gaming demand.
Despite frequent editorial supposition estimating the impact o f increases in gaming
taxes on the commercial gaming industry, there exists no prior empirical study examining
this issue the knowledge o f this researcher. Previous research has addressed changes in
commercial gaming restrictions with similar results. Commercial gaming’s stakeholders
have frequently advocated the economic penalties inherent in inflated gaming taxation
but have been unable to reference academically rigorous research supporting or refuting
their position.
Limitations
As mentioned in the introduction, the findings o f this thesis must be considered with
regard to the inherent limitations. Since this research analyzes only a single tax increase
in a single Midwestern state in the United States, the degree to which the results are
generalizable is limited. Further study o f other state tax changes and possibly tax
restructuring in foreign locales will help address this limitation. Coin-in while ostensibly
the best representative o f gaming demand does not constitute the entire revenue equation.
Therefore understanding the table game contribution to revenue will strengthen the
understanding o f the correlation between gaming taxation and gaming demand. Further
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insight into table games play will become possible when tracking systems for table games
become both more prevalent and effective.
Recommendations fo r Further Study
Table and games analysis
Although slot revenue comprises the greatest proportion o f Illinois total gaming
revenue, table play nevertheless fulfills an important function in the overall revenue mix.
In addition, it is unclear whether table players are more or less impacted by expense
alterations in conjunction to tax changes. Therefore understanding this market segment is
critical and slot demand should not be assumed to reflect generalized gaming demand
which includes table games. The ability to measure table game play should improve as
casino based table game systems become more efficient and more widely adopted.
Managerial Implications
Much speculation has been cast upon the adjustments managers o f commercial
gaming operations invoke when pressured by increased gaming taxes. Future research
attempting to uncover whether and to what degree marketing expenditures, capital
improvement, and employee retention/hiring rates are curtailed would be useful.
Comparison across States
Further analysis o f the impact o f other states gaming tax changes and the effect on
gaming demand would contribute to a comprehensive understanding o f the relationship
between gaming taxes and gaming demand. It is conceivable that other Midwestern
states with limited gaming licenses are either more or less tolerant to gaming tax
increases than less restricted states such as Nevada or Mississippi. In addition, research
designed to understand how gaming tax restructuring affects gaming demand in
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neighboring states might serve to illuminate the interstate balance among commercial
gaming states. If gaming tax increases move gaming demand and tax receipts from the
legislator’s own state to their neighbor, state governments may became increasingly
cautionary before making drastic changes.
Conclusion
By examining the relationship between the 2003 Illinois tax restructuring and coin-in
this thesis indicates that increases in gaming taxation had a significant negative effect on
Illinois gaming demand. A multiple regression model utilizing dummy variables was
developed to analyze coin-in data collected from the Illinois Gaming Board representing
the time period o f January 2000 to December 2006. Since the regression equation’s error
terms reflected autocorrelation, a Box Jenkins model was incorporated to resolve this
issue.
The results o f this study affirm previous inquiry into the relationship between hotel
room demand and increases in occupancy taxes. Furthermore, this thesis reinforces the
findings o f prior studies which identified a correlation between increases in cigarette
taxes and decreased tobacco consumption; and also supports studies examining the
negative impact on real estate investors from the 1986 Tax Reform Act.
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